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Corporate Law:
Resolution Triggers for
Systematically Important Financial Institutions1
John Crawford
One of the great regulatory challenges to emerge from last
decade’s financial crisis was the problem of “too-big-to-fail” financial
institutions—those firms whose failure could trigger widespread runs in
the financial system. When such firms faltered in 2008, regulators
faced the dilemma of either acquiescing to financial panic and the
attendant economic wreckage, or putting taxpayer money at risk to bail
out the firm and its creditors. Regulators have made significant
progress in designing mechanisms to avoid this dilemma.2 This
progress has, however, primarily centered on what happens once a
systematically important financial institution (SIFI) is in resolution.
The lack of robust mechanisms to ensure a SIFI is placed in resolution
in a timely manner lingers as a major weakness in these schemes. This
chapter summarizes the costs and causes of delay in triggering
resolution and evaluates different approaches to mitigating these costs
and causes.
The Costs of Delay
Delay in triggering resolution for a bank or SIFI is pernicious
because losses are likely to worsen at firms with razor-thin or negative
capital;3 weak firms thus have an incentive to “gamble for
resurrection,” taking imprudent risks to climb back to solvency,
confident that the costs of bad outcomes will be borne by creditors or
taxpayers.
1. Summarized and excerpted from John Crawford, Resolution Triggers
for Systemically Important Financial Institutions, 97 NEB. L. REV. 65 (2018)
and from John Crawford, Resolution Triggers and TLAC Tradeoffs, OXFORD
BUSINESS LAW BLOG (2018).
2. For detailed analyses of these mechanisms, see John Crawford, “Single
Point of Entry”: The Promise and Limits of the Latest Cure for Bailouts, 109
NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 103 (2014), and John Crawford, Credible Losers: A
Regulatory Design for Prudential Market Discipline, 54 AM. BUS. L.J. 107
(2017).
3. “Capital” in the banking context, and as used here, refers roughly to a
firm’s balance-sheet equity—that is, the difference between the value of the
firm’s assets and its liabilities.
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To illustrate this dynamic, consider the stylized example of a firm
whose liabilities exceed the value of its assets by $20, but which has
not yet been placed in bankruptcy or resolution proceedings. The firm
is considering two investments. Investment A has a 10-percent chance
of gaining $100 and a 90-percent chance of losing $100; and
investment B has a 90-percent chance of gaining $10 and a 10-percent
chance of losing $10. Investment A has an expected value of negative
$80; B has an expected value of (positive) $8. Investment B is thus the
superior choice from the aggregate perspective of all stakeholders in
the firm: while it will not return the firm to solvency, it will mitigate
the losses to creditors. The shareholders, however, do not bear any of
the losses in either scenario: because capital is already negative, any
further losses will be borne by creditors. Therefore, the expected return
to shareholders from the two investments yields a different result: The
expected return to shareholders from investment A is $8,4 while the
expected value of B is zero.5 The shareholders will thus prefer
investment A in this stylized example, even though both the probability
of loss and the magnitude of loss in the downside scenario will be
much greater. It is worth emphasizing that the thicker a firm’s capital
cushion, the less shareholders and managers will be able to shift losses
onto other claimants, and the less these perverse risk-shifting incentives
will apply.
While the example above is highly stylized, the dynamic of
“gambling for resurrection” was central to the savings and loan (S&L)
crisis of the 1980s. Hundreds of S&Ls failed during the 1980s, but a
large number were permitted to continue operating for extended
periods—often years—with capital buffers that were razor thin, or even
negative by some measures. At the outset of the crisis, trouble arose
primarily from rising market interest rates, rather than from rising
defaults by those that had borrowed from the bank. Rising interest
rates increased the interest the S&Ls had to pay to their depositors, but
did not increase the money flowing into the S&Ls from their existing
stock of assets—primarily long-term fixed-rate mortgages. (The rates
4. This is equal to 0.1 * ($100 - $20). Note that even in this good state of
the world, the shareholders will need to spend $20 to climb out of their capital
hole. The $100 in (further) losses in the event of failure is ignored by
shareholders in this stylized example: Again, shareholders have already lost
everything, and, due to limited liability, do not bear any further liability for the
firm’s losses.
5. Even in the good state of the world, in which the investment yields
$10, this will serve merely to mitigate losses to creditors, and will not fill the
capital hole of $20. The equity position of the firm will continue to be
negative.
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on these mortgages had been set before market interest rates rose.)
Measuring assets by what they could be sold for in the market rather
than with historical accounting methods, many S&Ls owed more than
their assets were now worth—that is, they were insolvent.
Regulators, however, permitted market-insolvent S&Ls to continue
operating, hoping they would dig themselves out of their holes, and
slackened various rules to permit them to make the attempt. Many
S&Ls responded by getting more aggressive (that is, less careful) in
their underwriting and risk management. The unhappy result was that
what started as an interest-rate crisis—one that was partially undone
once interest rates started falling again—morphed into a crisis of bad
loans that significantly worsened losses, which were ultimately borne
by taxpayers.
The Causes of Delay
A bias toward delaying resolution unfortunately seems to infect all
key actors. This likely has a variety of causes. Regulators, for
example, do not always appreciate the logic behind SIFIs’ risk-shifting
incentives—after all, these firms surely do not want to lose money.
Regulators and policymakers might also worry about political backlash
when the SIFI’s managers and lobbyists contest the finding of
nonviability. As former Deputy Governor of the Bank of England Paul
Tucker has observed, “if faced with uncertain long-term benefits but an
immediate risk of unpopularity, a policy maker might incline toward
delaying action until the resilience-eroding threats of exuberance or
imbalances were widely perceived.”6
Another set of reasons might be grouped under the rubric of
“capture”—that is, the excessive identification of regulators with the
industry they regulate. Capture can arise from a direct conflict of
interest, such as when a regulator acquiesces to decisionmakers at a
firm where she hopes one day to work, or from subtler conflicts, such
as when a regulator shows “deference to high-status regulated
executives [or] to those with whom [she] has face-to-face relationships,
because of empathy or the desire to avoid conflict.”7 While a decision
on triggering a SIFI resolution would be made at the highest level,
capture could be a problem even if it affected only lower level

6. Paul Tucker, The Design and Governance of Financial Stability
Regimes, 3 ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL 48 (Sept. 2016).
7. Philip Wallach, What is Regulatory Capture?, THE NEW RAMBLER
(2015).
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regulators, if it were to shape the information high-level officials
received.
Yet another reason for delay is that the primary measure used for
triggering resolution—that is, capital—does not always capture the
“real” state of the bank’s balance sheet. Market expectation of a higher
percentage of defaults on a bank’s loans, for example, does not
necessarily mean that the bank will increase its accounting-based
provisions for expected defaults or losses in a timely manner. Thus,
regulatory measures of capital are “lagging indicators” of trouble at
banks—that is, there is often a significant lag between trouble
materializing with respect to a bank’s assets (or the market’s
recognition of such trouble), and the reflection of that trouble in the
bank’s regulatory accounting measures.
Promoting Timeliness
Several possible reforms could help promote timeliness in
triggering resolution; this chapter addresses two. The first is that
regulators should use market-based measures as triggers for remedial
actions, up to and including resolution. A Dodd-Frank-mandated rule
that was proposed but never finalized would have provided for marketbased triggers for early regulatory intervention, and for the continued
study and evaluation of such metrics as potential triggers for more
drastic regulatory actions, including resolution.8 This rule should be
taken up again and finalized.
A second reform arises in the context of the “total loss absorbing
capacity” (TLAC) rules that apply to large bank holding companies,
requiring them to maintain long-term debt and equity above prescribed
minimums. The advantage of TLAC is that it can absorb losses
without triggering panicked runs—a major risk generated by imposing
losses on short-term debt. TLAC plays a central role in efforts to
facilitate resolution without forcing regulators to face a choice between
bailouts and panic.
TLAC’s effectiveness rests first and foremost on whether the
overall requirements are set at adequate levels. A related but distinct
question ties directly back to the issue of trigger timing: namely, for a
given aggregate amount of TLAC, how much should be in the form of
long-term debt, and how much in equity? (Currently the proportion is
roughly one-third debt and two-thirds common equity.)

8. Enhanced Prudential Standards and Early Remediation for Covered
Companies, 77 Fed. Reg. 594 (Proposed Rule, Jan. 5, 2012).
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Equity has its advantages. It can absorb losses without implicating
difficult triggering questions that arise with debt. Moreover, a higher
proportion of equity can mitigate perverse risk-shifting incentives on
the part of shareholders, as captured by the notion of “gambling for
resurrection,” described above. A thicker equity cushion operates like
the deductible on an insurance policy, making a firm’s residual
claimants more sensitive to the downside risks of aggressive strategies.
Cutting in the other direction, some observers believe that higher
debt-to-equity ratios impose discipline on firm managers, helping solve
a potential agency problem by limiting the free cash flow firm
managers have to hide underperformance or “benefit taking.”9 Other
observers, however, have critiqued this view as misplaced in the
context of banks.10 From this latter standpoint, TLAC shouldn’t
include long-term debt at all.11
Even if one rejects the view that debt solves an agency problem,
there is another factor that counsels against eliminating long-term debt
as a component of TLAC—and that, indeed, may support higher levels
than we currently see. Specifically, long-term debt may help mitigate
or counteract the delay-inducing factors cited above—especially
regulatory capital’s lag time for indicating real economic
developments, and political pressure not to rock the boat.
Long-term debt’s potential role in mitigating the bad effects of
capital lag is straightforward: A SIFI should be put into resolution
when it is at or near the point of insolvency, and capital lag means that
a firm may be (deeply) insolvent by the time it hits a capital-based
resolution tripwire. Regulators relying solely on equity to absorb
losses in such a case would again face the bailout-or-panic dilemma.
But consideration of sufficient long-term debt could reveal credible
loss-bearing capacity beyond the point of (real) insolvency.

9. See, e.g., Caterina Mendicino et al., Equity Versus Bail-in Debt in
Banking: An Agency Perspective, European Systemic Risk Board, Working
Paper No. 50 (2017).
10. See Anat R. Admati & Martin F. Hellwig, Does Debt Discipline
Bankers? An Academic Myth About Bank Indebtedness, Rock Center for
Corproate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 132 (2013).
11. Anat R. Admati, The Missed Opportunity and Challenge of Capital
Regulation, Rock Center for Corproate Governance at Stanford University
Working Paper No. 216; Stanford University Graduate School of Business
Research Paper No. 16-6 (2015).
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An alternative is to mandate that TLAC be all equity but set a
much higher threshold for triggering resolution.12 But pulling the
resolution trigger on a firm when its regulatory measures of capital
indicate that it is fundamentally solvent is not a politically stable
solution to the problem of timeliness. If the resolution trigger is pulled
when a SIFI loses, say, two-thirds of its equity, the SIFI’s remaining
(ostensible) capital buffer against insolvency would weaken everyone’s
sense of urgency and strengthen banks’ persuasiveness when they argue
against specific triggering decisions. Even if one could credibly
remove all regulatory discretion and make the higher equity-based
trigger automatic, it would be highly vulnerable to bank lobbying and
legislative rollback. The fallout of SIFI failure and capital as a lagging
indicator are complicated ideas; government seizure of an ostensibly
solvent firm is straightforward and presumably distasteful to many
elected representatives in the United States. The resolution of a firm
that—by regulatory metrics—is insolvent is less likely to invite
backlash. Requiring that some portion of TLAC be satisfied with longterm debt, then, can be understood as a way to force regulators’ hand
and weaken political and institutional inertia when it comes to putting a
weak SIFI into resolution.
Conclusion
Timeliness is essential if the resolution mechanisms designed to
avoid the bailout-or-panic dilemma are to serve their purpose.
Regulators, however, have not yet paid sufficient attention to ensuring
timeliness in triggering resolution. Two reforms could help counteract
the bias toward delay inherent in the decision to place a SIFI into
resolution: the incorporation of market metrics into the triggering
framework, and ensuring adequate long-term debt as loss-absorbing
capital.

12. See Matt Levine, Regulators Want Banks to Rescue Themselves Next
Time, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Nov. 11, 2014).

